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Abstract
Paul Tillich is arguably the most important exponent of the theology of culture. As a religious
socialist Tillich felt compelled to leave National Socialist Germany in 1933 and to emigrate to the
United States where he established himself as a major figure in American theology. Among his
most influential works is the book The Courage to Be, which presents an existentialist Ground of
Being theology as a basis upon which to address the concerns of people living in a period
increasingly characterised by anxiety. The purpose of this article is to examine The Courage to Be
against the background of the growth of conservative cultural and political trends in the United
States. Originally presented as four lectures in the Autumn of 1950 at Yale University, The Courage
to Be was expanded into a six chapter book and published in 1952. The article comparatively
examines certain observations Tillich makes about Marxism and Soviet and American national life
in the pre-revised lectures of1950 and the published texts of 1952 against the background of the
ascendancy of McCarthyism in the United States. We propose that in revising the original lectures
Tillich becomes more critical of Marxism and the Soviet Union and, in certain respects, less critical
of the United States; it is our view that such revisions represent concessions to the anti-left wing
mood of the period. In undertaking such a contextualised comparative textual analysis, we seek to
show that the scholar of religion and culture does not work in isolation but in creative tension with
his or her context and that context is a fundamentally important factor in contributing to the shaping
of ideas and texts.
"The soul of the German people can again express itself. These flames not only illuminate the final
end of an old era; they also light up the new."1 These words were addressed by the Nazi minister of
propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, on the evening of May 10 1933 to a crowd of students who were
putting to the torch thousands of books deemed by the newly elected National Socialist government
to be subversive.
Among the books burnt in the torch light parades that were taking place across Germany that night
was Paul Tillich's Die Sozialistische Entscheidung (The Socialist Decision), a work that prescribed
a new post-imperial social order based on the co-operation of the German Lutheran church and the
labour movement. Tillich's belief in the need for such an alliance derived from his perception of the
1 Goebbels is quoted in William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (London:
Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1951; reprint, London: Redwood Press Ltd., 1971), 241.
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limitations of both sectors. According to Tillich, the Lutheran church had erred by allying itself too
closely to the monarchy and by ignoring the needs and legitimate aspirations of the labour
movement, with the consequence that it had alienated from itself a large swathe of German society.
The socialist movement, on the other hand, was limited by the absence of a self-critical religious
dimension, without which any movement risked degenerating into a condition of self-authentication
and the consequent development of totalitarian tendencies. 
The advocacy of religious socialism found no favour in post-Weimar Germany. Published only a
few months before the Nazis came to power, Die Sozialistische Entscheidung was denounced by the
Frankfurter Zeitung as pro-socialist; the work was banned by the authorities, and Tillich was
suspended from his post at the University of Frankfurt. Along with nearly 1700 scholars, Tillich was
removed from the German higher education system as part of the authorities' quest to unify German
culture along Nazi lines.2
Fortuitously, Henry Sloane Coffin, the president of Union Theological Seminary in New York, was
in Germany during the fateful summer of 1933. On learning of Tillich's situation, Coffin offered
Tillich a position at Union, where he was to remain for the next twenty-two years. Here Tillich
continued to be politically engaged through his involvement with the Fellowship of Socialist
Christians, under the leadership of Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as through the various refugee groups
which had been established to assist those who had fled Nazi Germany. Tillich's political activism
continued during the Second World War when he worked for the Voice of America, making
broadcasts to Germany, and also served as chairman of the Council for a Democratic Germany, an
organisation of left-wing intellectuals working for the peaceful reconstruction of post-war Germany.
Such active political engagement came to an abrupt end following the end of the Second World War
and the emergence of the Cold War. As the national atmosphere became increasingly inimical to
left-wing politics, Tillich moved away from religious socialist prescriptions to a more privatised
form of theology whose concern was to address the situation of the individual in an age when
anxiety was becoming a major area of cultural concern.
Tillich's most important contribution to the contemporary intellectual engagement with anxiety was
his book of 1952 The Courage to Be. This work drew upon the existentialist themes Tillich had
brought with him from Germany to America, expressed in a liberal Protestant format, and found a
ready audience in a culture exposed to the recent transmission of existentialist literature from
Europe and immersed in the anxieties of deepening Cold War tensions. 
The purpose of The Courage to Be is to address the question how it is possible to confront the
ontological reality of anxiety without succumbing to the temptation to enclose oneself in an
inauthentic, self-limiting but ostensibly secure belief-system. The book begins with an analysis of
the nature of courage through the ideas of Plato, the Stoics, Aquinas, Spinoza and Nietzsche. What
links these philosophers or traditions is the recognition of the finitude inherent in the human
condition and the consequent inevitable human participation in nonbeing. Nonbeing is central to
2 For details of the Nazi purges of German universities see Fritz R. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins:
The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (London: Wesleyan University Press, 1990), 440; see also E.V.
Harteshorne, The German Universities and National Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), 87,
100.
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Tillich's view of the world: nonbeing is not merely the hypostasisation of the word "nothingness"; it
is an ontological reality that perpetually threatens to undermine the order of things. In human terms
to live under the threat of nonbeing is to live in a condition of finitude with the constant possibility
of failure, disintegration and death. 
The recognition of the fact of finitude and nonbeing creates anxiety. In The Courage to Be Tillich
identifies three types of existential anxiety. The first of these is the anxiety of fate and death. We
live with the awareness that one day we will be extinguished by death and are constantly reminded
of our vulnerability through encountering factors affecting our lives over which we have no control.
Secondly, humanity lives with the threat of meaninglessness. To live meaningfully is to have a
source of ultimate concern which gives purpose and value to existence. Ultimate concern is the
source of our spiritual centre - that is, our capacity for self-affirmation - and without it we incur the
risk of self-disintegration. Thirdly, there is the anxiety of guilt. To live is to live with the
responsibility to affirm or to realise oneself: to fail to do so creates a sense of guilt that our essential
nature has been neglected.
These forms of anxiety are termed "existential," and are so called because they are integral and
inescapable dimensions of human existence. They do not, however, represent anxiety in its totality.
A distinct category of anxiety, which is not existentially ubiquitous, is pathological anxiety.
Pathological anxiety derives from unresolved conflicts between different elements of the personality
as, for example, the conflict between the drives of the unconscious and the need to repress these
drives for the sake of social integration. The outcome of the failure to deal effectively with the
source of pathological anxiety is neurosis or psychosis. Neurotics are in conflict with the situation in
which they find themselves and affirm only a limited part of their being in order to preserve their
entire being.
Courage is the principle which enables people to recognise the fact of nonbeing and to affirm and
develop their own being in the face of nonbeing. Such an ontology of the self provides the means to
define the identity of the individual as a social being interacting with the group and as an isolated
individual. Self-affirmation through the group is called the courage to be as a part and such courage
provides the means to diminish the anxiety of death, meaninglessness and guilt. By identifying with
the group one becomes part of something that will outlive one's own existence and which, therefore,
confers to some extent the power to overcome the anxiety of death. Similarly, the society, the
community, or the collective can provide a sense of meaningful engagement and, therefore, reduce
the possibility of spiritual disintegration. Finally, as a source of collectively held values, the
community provides its members with the opportunity to live relatively free from the anxiety of
guilt, so long as one adheres to the collective's values.
The courage to be as oneself is more relevant to the character of the modern period. This form of
courage entails the affirmation of the individual as a being significantly distinct from the group or
society to which the individual belongs. Individualism was given impetus by the Enlightenment
through the proclamation of the universality of reason. Tillich identifies romanticism, naturalism,
pragmatism and existentialism as examples of movements which promote individualism.
Existentialism represents the most developed form of the courage to be as oneself since
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existentialism, in Tillich's understanding, is a revolt against all forces that seek to deny the fullness
and autonomy of the individual. Thus, there are existentialist motifs in Pascal's denunciation of
Descartes' conception of humanity as essentially rational, in the Romantics' attack on Enlightenment
rationality, in Kierkegaard's attack on the Hegelian equation of the real and the rational, in Marx's
struggle against the dehumanising effects of unregulated capitalism, and in Nietzsche's concept of
the will to power which is understood by Tillich as "the self affirmation of life as life."3
These existentialist motifs have developed into a philosophy in its own right in 20th century
existentialism, whose principal concern is to address the question how the individual can live in a
world which has lost its traditional values and beliefs. Where do we go now that God is dead? For
Tillich this loss of the sense of the transcendent and divinely legitimated values leads initially to
despair, a phenomenon that Tillich calls the courage of despair. Despair is a necessary concomitant
to radical individualism because it entails the loss of those things that tie us to other people. This
despair is expressed in literary works such as Kafka's The Trial, Camus' The Outsider, or Auden's
The Age of Anxiety since they depict characters whose experience of the loss of a sense of belonging
to the world leads to the total loss of a sense of meaning. The courage of despair, however, is not
where we should end up. Having encountered despair we should seek to participate in the power of
being. What should be sought is a form of mystical union with the ground of being or as Tillich
terms it "the God above God."4 The God above God is the God beyond theism, the God who
appears "when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt."5
As we can see from this brief exposition, The Courage to Be is principally a work of contextual
theology. It addresses the concerns of a period characterised by anxiety through offering a ground of
being theology as an alternative to mainstream Christianity. It is our view that The Courage to Be
should be read not only as a theological work but as one which has a political dimension: in
presenting an ontology of the self in relation to culture The Courage to Be engages with themes
whose analysis is informed by the political character and concerns of the period. Our examination of
the politics of The Courage to Be is based on a comparative analysis of certain texts from the
original lectures on which the book is based with texts taken from the book itself. The Courage to
Be originally consisted of four lectures (The Terry Lectures) presented in the Autumn of 1950 at
Yale University. By 1952 the four lectures had been expanded into a book of six chapters. Thus,
what we have are two texts serving somewhat different purposes: a series of lectures aimed at an
elite academic audience and a book intended for a comparatively wide readership. The question I
wish to address is: what impact, if any, did the context of post-1945 America have on the way in
which Tillich reshaped and re-presented his work in order to make it more accessible to a wider
audience. This question specifically concerns the way in which Tillich depicts contemporary
politico-cultural trends in the Soviet Union and the United States in the light of the growing anti-left
outlook that defined post-1945 American national life. In order to address this question, I propose to
examine the following four areas: 1)Tillich's conception of the courage to be a part as applied to the
Soviet Union, 2) Tillich's analysis of the state of contemporary Marxism, 3) Tillich's critique of
3 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 26.
4 Ibid., 186.
5 Ibid., 190.
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current intellectual trends in the United States, and 4) Tillich's perception of growing conformist
tendencies in American public life. 
In his analysis of the courage to be a part Tillich identifies Soviet collectivism as an important
example of a social system that enables the individual to cope with the anxiety of nonbeing through
submerging the identity of the individual into the collective. In both the texts of 1950 and 1952
Tillich engages with the question why communism has proven to be such a powerful force in the
middle of the 20th century. The answer lies in communism's provision of a sense of collective
protection in the face of the break down of traditional ways of life: it is the possibility of meaningful
self-affirmation within the collective that makes communism attractive. The communist's
willingness to endure personal sacrifice results from the communist's principal sense of identity
with the movement rather than the self, and the West must be prepared to understand communism's
power to inspire self-sacrificial loyalty if it is to grasp the factors that have led to the rapid spread of
communism. As Tillich writes in the 1950 lectures:
It seems to me that the most striking phenomena in the communist way of life can be
understood only in the light of an ontology of courage. Whatever the methods of political
propaganda are, philosophy and theology must understand before they reject.6 
Interestingly, the prescription that theology and philosophy must try to understand communism's
capacity to inspire an ontology of courage before rejecting communism is not to be found in the
book of 1952. 
In both texts Tillich draws comparisons between communism and other forms of totalitarian
politics. In the 1950 lectures Tillich describes both communism and fascism as "re-established
collectivism." By this he means that totalitarian systems constitute attempts to re-establish
tendencies towards collectivism that are always latent in history. At the same time, however, he
endeavours to distinguish fascism and communism by ascribing to fascism a regressive, tribal
identity and to communism a progressive, rational identity. 
But it is not in the primitive, it is the re-established collectivism with which we must deal in
the light of the ontology of courage. And here again it is not the fascist relapse to tribal
collectivism, but it is the [progressivistic/technically rational] neo-collectivist form as it
appears in the communism of present day Russia.7
Here Tillich is making a distinction between a form of reactionary, backward looking collectivism,
a return to a form of primitivism, which he considers to be characteristic of fascism, and a future
oriented form of collectivism which characterises communism through its belief in technology and
progress. This distinction is not made in the text of 1952. In fact in1952 Tillich appears to equate
totalitarian systems of the left and the right by extending the term "neocollectivist" (which in the
1950 lectures was used to designate communism alone) to all forms of totalitarian politics. "In
reaction to the predominance of the courage to be as oneself in modern western history, movements
of a neocollectivist character have arisen: fascism, nazism and communism."8 The sense that
6 Paul Tillich, manuscript of the Terry Lectures, Paul Tillich Archives, Andover-Harvard library, Box No. 502:002.
7 Ibid.
8 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, 96.
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communism, fascism and National Socialism are all part of the same political culture is reinforced
through Tillich's claim that they use technology to foster the establishment of an anti-modernist and
anti-individualist society. Thus, whereas in 1950 Tillich differentiated communism from fascism
and National Socialism through defining communism in terms of its commitment to technological
progress, in 1952 all three systems are identified by their use of technology as an instrument of
enforced collectivism.
This tendency to alter the text is also evident in Tillich's analysis of the failure of Marxism in the
Soviet Union. In the 1950 lectures Tillich writes: 
If we remember that Marxism had been conceived as the fight for the humanity of everybody
it is one of the greatest tragedies of all history that the struggle for the salvation of self and
freedom in original Marxism has become a complete self-loss in the most oppressive of all
social systems. The immensity of this tragedy in terms of psychological destruction can
hardly be imagined. A whole generation of intelligentsia has either been deprived of itself or
it has been turned into a fanatical attack against the system of oppression. But fanaticism is
neurotic. It suppresses parts of its being in order to save the rest. An ontology of courage
makes the disrupted state of the western intelligentsia understandable. It largely oscillates
between no courage and neurotic courage.9
The revised passage in The Courage to Be reads as follows:
It is the great tragedy of our time that Marxism, which had been conceived as a movement
for the liberation of everyone, has been transformed into a system of enslavement of
everyone, even of those who enslave the others. It is hard to imagine the immensity of this
tragedy in terms of psychological destruction, especially within the intelligentsia. The
courage to be was undermined in innumerable people because it was the courage to be in the
sense of the revolutionary movements in the 19th century. When it broke down, these people
turned either to the neocollectivist system, in a fanatic neurotic reaction against the cause of
their tragic disappointment, or to a cynical neurotic indifference to all systems and every
content.10
There are obvious thematic similarities between the two texts: namely, the catastrophic demise of
Marxism in the Soviet Union from a philosophy that promised the liberation of people into a system
which oppresses people, and the devastating effect of this transition on intellectuals who had placed
their faith in Marxism. However, there are also noticeable differences. In revising his original text,
Tillich has introduced changes which alter his depiction of Marxism and strengthen the anti-Soviet
tone. Thus whereas in 1950 the demise of Marxism is described as "one of the greatest tragedies of
all history," in 1952 it is "the great tragedy of our time." Such a revision downplays the importance
of Marxism as a significant historical force by toning down the language of tragedy, by removing
the reference to history and by placing Marxism's tragic demise squarely in the present. 
In 1950 the Soviet Union is described as the "most oppressive of all social systems"; in 1952 it is "a
system of enslavement of everyone, even of those who enslave the others." Here the depiction of the
9 Paul Tillich, manuscript of the Terry Lectures.
10 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, 153.
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Soviet Union has undergone a transition from being an oppressive system to being a slave state.
We also note that in the 1952 text Tillich has deleted the word "western" and has interpolated the
expression "cynical-neurotic indifference to all systems and every content." This interpolation has
two consequences. Firstly, it politicises the word "neurotic". Elsewhere in The Courage to Be the
term "neurotic" is used to describe people who when confronted with the reality of existential
anxiety only affirm a limited part of themselves in the form of a narrow belief system. In this
particular context Tillich is referring to Marxists who accepted Soviet collectivism in spite of its
clear limitations or disillusioned Marxists who lost their faith in Marxism and, with this loss,
abandoned faith in everything. Secondly, it removes any obvious reference to Western intellectuals.
It would seem that Tillich is referring only to Russian Marxists in 1952; it is only when we read the
published text in conjunction its original that it is clear he is referring to Western intellectuals as
well as Russians. 
Moving onto Tillich's observations about contemporary American society, we also find a number of
interesting revisions that have been made to the original lectures. In both the lectures of 1950 and
the book of 1952 Tillich addresses the problem of philosophical relativism and indifference to
questions relating to absolute truth that he perceives to have entered national academic life. In the
lectures of 1950 Tillich denounces those academics who are indifferent to questions relating to
philosophical absolutes. He talks about two types: the indifferent and the cynic. The indifferent,
who is personified by Meursault, the central character of Camus' novel, L'Etranger, is one who has
no concern for values, truth and meaning. The cynic is one who is not only without a concern for
philosophical absolutes but who seeks to destroy all values or philosophical norms. Tillich
comments somewhat ominously on this state of affairs:
A country in which the intelligentsia is without passion and despair, in which it shows
neither the courage to be a part, nor the courage to be oneself, nor something above both of
them is lost.11
This description of American intellectual life is reminiscent of a comment made in a series of
lectures given by Tillich in Berlin in 1951 entitled "The Political Meaning of Utopia". Here Tillich
writes:
I can assure you, however, that in America's academic institutions a wave of what Americans
call "cynicism" is rising today, a kind of bored, supercilious indifference to all questions of
content and all norms.12
Such a perspective conflicts with Tillich's own philosophical position based in the belief in
absolutes and the rejection of all forms of relativism. In Tillich's view the rejection of absolutes was
not merely philosophically unsound but politically dangerous: without philosophical norms a
cultural vacuum is created which can lead to the undermining of society and the emergence of an
anti-democratic mentality. This possibly explains why Tillich went so far in his 1950 lectures as to
describe a country whose intelligentsia lacked the passion for truth as "lost." 
11 Paul Tillich, manuscript of the Terry Lectures.
12 Paul Tillich, "The Political Meaning of Utopia," in Political Expectations, ed. James Luther Adams (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), 140.
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Tillich's approach to the theme of cynicism and indifference in 1952 is less bluntly anti-American
than in his lectures of 1950 and 1951. Nowhere in the book The Courage to Be does he describe the
United States as a country which is "lost." Moreover, he discusses the idea of cynicism in such a
way that there is no suggestion he is attacking a specific group, profession or nation. In 1952 Tillich
simply refers to modern cynics.
Modern cynics are not ready to follow anybody. They have no belief in reason, no criterion
of truth, no set of values, no answer to the question of meaning. They try to undermine every
norm put before them.13
Similarly, when Tillich discusses the theme of indifference in 1952 he makes no open criticism of
the American academy; he achieves this by omitting in the published text the passage in which
Meursault is presented as a personified image of the outlook of the academy. 
Although Tillich is more guarded in his criticisms of American academic life in 1952 than in 1950,
in 1952 he is generally more critical of what he considers to be growing conformist tendencies in
American culture at large. In the 1952 text we do find criticisms of contemporary American culture
which are not found in the original lectures. On a number of occasions Tillich expresses concern
over the increasing pressure in the United States to adopt a conformist outlook, a phenomenon
described by Tillich as "democratic conformism". Tillich observes that in spite of the transmission
of existentialism from Europe to America "participation in given structures of life are rapidly
increasing. Conformity is growing, but it has not yet become collectivism."14
Two factors have contributed to this increase in conformity: technology and the cold war.
Technology has facilitated the growth of society into fixed patterns: the more uniform the methods
of production are, the more the productive process has demanded conformity. The Cold War has
accelerated conformist pressures within American society, producing a form of cultural
collectivism.
World political thinking, the struggle with collectivism, forced collectivist features on those
who fought against them. This process is still going on and may lead to a strengthening of
the conformist elements in the type of the courage to be as a part which is represented by
America.15
The forces behind this type of conformism are those groups which are hostile to heterododox forms
of cultural expression, an attitude which makes their conduct akin to that of neocollectivism.
The violent reaction against modern art in collectivist (Nazi, Communist) as well as
conformist (American democratic) groups shows that they feel seriously threatened by it.16
Ironically, it is the very groups who presume to be protecting American culture from the influence
of allegedly alien and disruptive forms of artistic and philosophical expression who are displaying a
mentality akin to that of the enemy they oppose. In the light of this, Tillich suggests that the role of
existentialism and modern art is to maintain the courage to be oneself in a period of growing
13 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, 150-1.
14 Ibid., 104.
15 Ibid., 112
16 Ibid., 141.
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cultural consensus.
Why has Tillich made these various changes to his original text? Is there any relationship between
the context within which he was writing and his decision to revise his text in the way he did? Let us
say a little about the context. Tillich wrote The Courage to Be at a time when civil liberties in the
United States were increasingly and alarmingly curtailed for the sake of perceived national security
interests. On the international front, the wartime co-operation between the United States and the
Soviet Union quickly deteriorated into open hostility. Disputes over the sharing of atomic
technology, the establishment of pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade of
1948, the Soviet detonation of its own atomic device in 1949, the Communist victory in China in
the same year, and the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 all added to the growing tensions on the
international front. 
This had a fundamental impact on national politics. The spread of communism throughout the globe
raised concerns that communist fifth columnists were active in the United States. In February 1950
J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, declared before the Senate that
there 540,000 dedicated communists in America. In the same month Senator Joseph McCarthy
claimed to have a list of 205 communists working in the State Department. Claims such as these
encouraged investigative committees, such as the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities or
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, to root out alleged communist influence in public life, a
process from which the academy was by no means immune.17
What impact did such trends have on Tillich's public political expression? Commenting on the
McCarthy phenomenon in the 1960s Tillich gives the impression that McCarthyism did not
constitute a source of concern to him.
During the McCarthy period my refugee friends from Europe - Germany and other countries
- kept saying "Fascism is coming here. Hitler's name is now McCarthy." But I always
insisted, "You do not know the Americans; you do not know the Middle West. You do not
know all the strong forces in the grass roots that would never accept this." And I was right of
course.18
While we need not doubt the truth of Tillich's claim that he did not regard McCarthy as the bearer of
a form of revived fascism, there are grounds for suggesting that Tillich is retrospectively
understating the sense of threat he felt in the face of the ascendancy of McCarthyism. We suggest
that there are three reasons why Tillich should have reacted with concern to the politics of the times.
Firstly, Tillich had communist or perceived communist associations dating back to the 1930s and
1940s. In the 1930s Tillich had sought to establish a dialogue between communists and on a number
of occasions drawn parallels between Christianity and communism. Tillich had also served on the
editorial board of a theological journal, The Protestant Digest, which was regarded in some quarters
as pro-communist. Secondly, Tillich himself had been blacklisted by the US army because of his
chairmanship of the Council for a Democratic Germany. Thirdly, a number of Tillich's associates
17 For an excellent study of the impact of McCarthyism on the universities see Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory
Tower:McCarthyism and the Universities. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
18 Paul Tillich, interview with D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (London: S.C.M. Press,
1965), 68-9.
9
Marburg Journal of Religion: Volume 4, No. 2 (December 1999)
had experienced difficulties because of their politics. Berthold Brecht, for example, who had served
on the Council for a Democratic Germany had appeared before the House Committee on
UnAmerican Activities in the context of the 1947 investigations into communism in the movie
industry. 
Tillich's anxieties about the mood of the period were explained to me by his friend and editor,
James Luther Adams: 
He [Tillich] felt himself to be a foreigner. In the face of these agitations he should be
quiet. . . . He said in conversation with me that the United States was far behind in these
matters, so that at this late date Americans could be shocked at anyone who showed
affiliation with Marx.19
In the light of Adams' comments and Tillich's engagement and sympathy with Marxism, I think it is
quite plausible that the revisions made to the original Courage to Be lectures reflect to some extent
the political environment within which he was working. The exclusion of the prescription that
theology should try to understand communism before rejecting it, the affirmation of a closer
affiliation between communism and National Socialism, and the description of the Soviet Union as
a "system of enslavement" in the book of 1952 represent, in my view, concessions to the wider
audience for whom the book is intended. Similarly, the toning down of some of the anti-American
statements made in the original lectures suggests that Tillich was concerned not to offend the
cultural sensibilities of his readership. This is not to deny that Tillich was prepared to introduce
criticisms of reactionary-conformist trends in contemporary America. It is in his analysis of the
cultural impact of technology that Tillich's criticisms of both totalitarian political systems and
reactionary tendencies in the United States converge. Technology is used in totalitarian systems to
enforce collectivism but has also the produced the kind of international tensions which inspire
conformist tendencies in reactionary groups. Part of the role of heterodox cultural forms is to
challenge the very conformist tendencies that inhibit the courage to be as oneself. Thus, the politics
of The Courage to Be can be understood to have two dimensions. On one level, Tillich is criticising
collectivist or conformist tendencies that he perceives to be strengthening in the context of Cold
War politics and is offering heterodox cultural forms as a means for the preservation of the
individual. On another level he is involved in a process in which he modifies his own political
views in order to avoid the difficulties a number of left-wing scholars encountered at that time. 
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19 James Luther Adams, interview with the author. Adams himself experienced difficulties during the McCarthy period
since he himself was investigated by the Seditious Activities Committed of the State Legislature of Illinois on the
grounds of his alleged communist sympathies. 
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